Your classic advanced microeconomic theory textbook delivering rigorous coverage of modern microeconomics.

Advanced Microeconomic Theory remains a rigorous, standard in microeconomics, giving all the core mathematics and modern theory the advanced student must master. This student-friendly text, with its efficient theorem-proof organisation, and many examples and exercises, is uniquely effective in advanced courses.

• PART 1: ECONOMIC AGENTS
• CHAPTER 1: CONSUMER THEORY
• CHAPTER 2: TOPICS IN CONSUMER THEORY
• CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF THE FIRM
• PART 2: MARKETS AND WELFARE
• CHAPTER 4: PARTIAL EQUALIBRIUM
• CHAPTER 5: GENERAL EQUALIBRIUM
• CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
• PART 3: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
• CHAPTER 7: GAME THEORY
• CHAPTER 8: INFORMATION ECONOMICS 
• CHAPTER 9: AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN 
• CHAPTER A1: SETS AND MAPPINGS 
• LIST OF THEOREMS
• LIST OF DEFINITIONS
• HINTS AND ANSWERS
• REFERENCES
• INDEX

The classic text in advanced microeconomic theory, revised and expanded.  

‘Advanced Microeconomic Theory’ remains a rigorous, up-to-date standard in microeconomics, giving all the core mathematics and modern theory the advanced student must master.  

Long known for careful development of complex theory, together with clear, patient explanation, this student-friendly text, with its efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises, is uniquely effective in advanced courses.

 New in this edition       

• General equilibrium with contingent commodities
• Expanded treatment of social choice, with a simplified proof of Arrow’s theorem and complete, step-by-step development of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Extensive development of Bayesian games
• New section on efficient mechanism design in the quasi-linear utility, private values environment. The most complete and easy to follow presentation of any text.
• Over fifty new exercises.

Essential reading for students at Masters level, those beginning a Ph.D and advanced undergraduates.  A book every professional economist wants in their collection.

• General equilibrium with contingent commodities
• Expanded treatment of social choice, with a simplified proof of Arrow’s theorem and complete, step-by-step development of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Extensive development of Bayesian games
• New section on efficient mechanism design in the quasi-linear utility, private values environment. The most complete and easy to follow presentation of any text.
• Over fifty new exercises.